We examine the investment rule that must be satisfied by an efficient and egalitarian path in a discrete-time version of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of capital accumulation and resource depletion. In the discrete-time model, competitive valuation of net investments in terms of early and late pricing differs.
Introduction
Hartwick's rule for sustainability prescribes reinvesting resource rents, thus keeping the value of net investments equal to zero. Originating from Hartwick's original article (Hartwick, 1977) , a series of papers (among others, Dixit, Hoel and Hammond, 1980; Withagen and Asheim, 1998; Mitra, 2002; Asheim, Buchholz and Withagen, 2003; Buchholz, Dasgupta and Mitra, 2005; Mitra et al., 2013) have contributed to our understanding of the connection between Hartwick's rule and a sustainable development with constant well-being.
In particular, there is a general relationship between implementing a path which keeps well-being constant (is egalitarian) and where well-being cannot be increased for some subinterval of time without being decreased at some other subinterval (is efficient), on the one hand, and Hartwick's rule for sustainability, on the other. This relationship can be stated through the following two results:
Hartwick's result. If along an efficient path Hartwick's rule is followed forever, then an egalitarian path is implemented.
The converse of Hartwick's result. If an efficient and egalitarian path is implemented, then Hartwick's rule is followed forever. Asheim (2013) presents an overview of how these results obtain in three different classes of technologies: (i) the one-sector growth model, (ii) the model of capital accumulation and resource depletion used by Hartwick, and (iii) a general model with multiple capital goods. Now, these results are established under assumptions that are rather strict: the economy is assumed to have constant technology and constant population. Furthermore, the economy is assumed to implement an efficient path in continuous time.
There are ways to relax each of these assumptions and still obtain some variant of Hartwick's result and its converse. For example, if there is exogenous technological progress in the sense of a time-dependent technology, we may restore these results by including time as an additional stock.
In this paper we focus on how to relax the assumption that time is continuous.
In reality, accounting for the value of net investments will take place at discrete points in time. Futhermore, Fleurbaey (2015, p. 35) suggests that the concept of sustainable development be analysed in discrete time "because discrete time makes it possible to obtain a clear distinction between what the current period does and what the next periods can do given the capital stocks they inherit". Thus, it is of interest to investigate to what extent the relationship between Hartwick's rule and a sustainable development with constant well-being survives in a discrete-time setting. This question was already raised by Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) in a discrete-time version of the model of capital accumulation and resource depletion used by Hartwick.
The results were discouraging in the sense that Hartwick's rule is not exactly followed along an efficient and egalitarian path, even if technology and population are constant and rather strong assumptions are imposed on the production function. This paper shows how the converse of Hartwick's result obtains in the model of capital accumulation and resource depletion under weaker assumptions than those imposed by Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) . In particular, we impose only regular neoclassical assumption on how net production is a function of the capital and resource use, while relaxing a requirement that resource use have a non-vanishing functional share of output as resource use approaches zero. And even though the competitive prices along such an efficient and egalitarian path do not provide the precise price ratio for which the value of net investments are zero, we show that such prices at the discrete points in time yield a narrow interval for the price ratio that gives zero value of net investments when going from one point in time to the next.
The proof of this result is based on the following observation made by Malinvaud (1953) in discrete time and developed in the context of efficient and egalitarian paths in continuous time by Mitra (2002) : Vectors of initial stocks that are sufficient to maintain well-being at or above a given level c form a convex set S(c). Furthermore, there is a relative price between capital and resource at which the vector of initial stocks that leads to an efficient and egalitarian path with well-being kept constant at c minimizes the cost of stocks evaluated over all vectors in S(c). Finally, by applying a suggestion made by Dasgupta and Mitra (1983, Section 7) , we show that this relative price is exactly the ratio of gross capital productivity to productivity of resource use, which is the competitive price ratio that compares the value of stock changes in the context of Hartwick's rule. Note that this last step is non-trivial and essential, as Hartwick's rule is defined in terms of competitive prices, not in terms of the "maximin" prices that support the set S(c).
The fact that the competitive value of stock is minimized is sufficient to establish that the competitive valuation of net investments between time period t and time period t + 1 is non-negative when valued at the (higher) early price ratio at t and non-positive when valued at the (lower) late price ratio at t + 1. Hence, there exists an intermediate price ratio of capital augmentation to resource use, between the one at t + 1 and the one at t, that leads to zero value of net investments. Thus, by redefining Hartwick's rule to require zero value of net investments at some valuation rule intermediate between early and late pricing, we show that Hartwick's rule is followed in all time periods along an efficient and egalitarian path.
Compared to Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) , we make the timing of prices more transparent, allowing us to introduce the terms 'early' and 'late' pricing and setting the stage for redefining Hartwick's rule in a manner appropriate for discrete time.
Moreover, by weakening the assumptions on the production function, we establish a significantly stronger result. With their additional assumption, namely that resource use have a non-vanishing functional share of output as resource use approaches zero, Dasgupta and Mitra (1983, Theorem 1) show that, if it is feasible to keep consumption bounded away from zero starting with given initial stocks of capital and resource, then these stocks can also give rise to an efficient and egalitarian path. Note that such a result cannot be established in the one-sector model of capital accumulation if there is a finite Golden Rule capital stock. Mitra et al. (2013, Theorem 2) indicate that the present model, which includes resource depletion, has similar properties: If initial stocks of capital and resource are too large, there might not exist any efficient and egalitarian path, even though these stocks are sufficient to keep consumption bounded away from zero. While the analysis of Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) is not applicable under such circumstances, we show that the converse of Hartwick's result holds for any initial stocks compatible with an efficient and egalitarian path; this corresponds to the analogous result in the one-sector model.
We start out in Section 2 by presenting the assumptions that we impose on the model of capital accumulation and resource depletion. We define properties for paths in this model, derive preliminary results on the competitive price support of interior paths (with positive capital and resource use in each time period), and adapt the definition of Hartwick's rule to the discrete-time setting. We then proceed in Section 3 to prove that the converse of Hartwick's result holds even in discrete time.
In the concluding Section 4 we show how our redefinition of Hartwick's rule follows naturally if we view discrete time as providing information at discrete points in time of an underlying continuous-time process. This perspective allows us to relate our adaptation of Hartwick's rule to discrete time to the continuous-time version of the converse of Hartwick's result. Furthermore, we discuss the challenges faced when attempting to establish Hartwick's rule as a prescriptive rule in a discretetime setting. In particular, we pose the question whether Hartwick's result can be demonstrated in discrete time, so that a policy of zero value of net investments can be used to steer the economy along an efficient and egalitarian path.
Framework
Consider a model with one produced good, which serves as both the capital and the consumption good, and an exhaustible resource. Labor is assumed to be constant over time. The framework described below is the standard one employed in the literature on intertemporal resource allocation in the presence of an exhaustible resource (see for example Solow, 1974; Dasgupta and Heal, 1974) , modified by a discrete-time formulation of the economic dynamics, following Mitra (1978) and Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) . We refer to this as the discrete-time DHS model. Denote by k the stock of the augmentable capital good (which is assumed to be non-depreciating), and by r the flow of exhaustible resource use. Let G : R 2 + → R + denote the production function for the capital/consumption good; the production process uses the capital stock, k, and the exhaustible resource use, r, as inputs. The net output G(k, r) is used to provide consumption c-being an indicator of wellbeing-or to provide augmentation of k. Output G(k, r) is the only source of flow of consumption or of net investment.
We will use the following standard assumptions on the production function G.
(G1) G(k, r) is a function from R 2 + to R + , which is continuous, non-decreasing and concave in (k, r) on R 2 + .
(G3) G is strictly increasing in each argument on R 2 ++ , and continuously differen-
These assumptions impose regular neoclassical properties and correspond to assumptions (A1)-(A3) of Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) . However, our results do not require assumption (A4) (or (A4 )) of Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) , imposing that resource use is 'important' in the sense that resource use has a non-vanishing functional share of output as resource use approaches zero. Assumptions (G1)-(G3) are always satisfied when G takes the Cobb-Douglas form (used by Solow, 1974) :
Denote by m the stock of the resource. The transformation of the stocks k and m from time period t (≥ 0) to the next time period t + 1 satisfies:
where y t , k t , m t , c t and r t are constrained to be non-negative for all t ≥ 0. This dynamic transformation can be expressed through the following tranformation set:
Denote by F(k, m) the set of paths from any (k, m) ∈ R 2 + . We provide a list of properties for paths: A path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m) ∈ R 2 + -is efficient if there does not exist {k t , m t , c t } ∈ F(k, m) with c t ≥ c t for all
-is competitive if there is a non-null sequence {p t , q t } of non-negative price pairs such that, for all t ≥ 0, we have:
-satisfies Hotelling's rule if {k t , m t , c t } is interior and:
-satisfies the capital-value transversality condition if {k t , m t , c t } is interior and:
-satisfies resource exhaustion if:
Consider an interior path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m) ∈ R 2 ++ and define a sequence {p t , q t } of positive price pairs as follows, where the resource is numéraire:
) and q t = 1 for all t ≥ 0 .
The following result summarizes the principal connections between competitive paths and Hotelling's rule in the context of the discrete-time DHS model.
Lemma 1 Asssume (G1)-(G3), and let {k t , m t , c t } be an interior path from (k, m) ∈ R 2 ++ . Then:
(a) If {k t , m t , c t } is non-wasteful and satisfies Hotelling's rule, then {k t , m t , c t } is competitive with associated sequence {p t , q t } of price pairs given by (P).
(b) If {k t , m t , c t } is competitive, then {p t , q t } given by (P) is an associated sequence of price pairs, which is unique up to a positive linear tranformation.
Furthermore, {k t , m t , c t } is non-wasteful and satisfies Hotelling's rule.
Proof. (a) Assume that {k t , m t , c t } is non-wasteful and satisfies Hotelling's rule.
Let t ≥ 0 be an arbitrary time period and let ((k, m), (y, m )) ∈ T . Then, denoting m − m by r and m t − m t+1 by r t , we have r ≥ 0 and:
where we have used non-wastefulness of {k t , m t , c t } in the first line of (2), and (G1) and (G3) in the second line of (2).
Dividing through in (2) by G r (k t , r t ) and using (H) and (P), we get:
Transposing terms in (3), we obtain that (C) is satisfied:
(b) Assume that {k t , m t , c t } is competitive with associated non-null sequence {p t , q t } of non-negative price pairs.
First, we establish that q t+1 = q t for all t ≥ 0. To show this, note that
for all ε ≥ −m t+1 (< 0), where t ≥ 0 is an arbitrary time period. Furthermore,
where the inequality might be strict if {k t , m t , c t } is not non-wasteful. By choosing ε > 0, the competitiveness of {k t , m t , c t } is contradicted if q t+1 > q t . And likewise, by choosing ε < 0, the competitiveness of {k t , m t , c t } is contradicted if q t+1 < q t .
Hence, q t = q ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Second, we observe that
would contract the competitiveness of {k t , m t , c t } as
Denoting m − m by r and m t − m t+1 by r t , it follows from (4) and the competitiveness of {k t , m t , c t } that, for all t ≥ 0:
Since the path {k t , m t , c t } is interior, we have that (k t , r t ) ∈ R 2 ++ for all t ≥ 0. The first-order conditions for the maximization in (5) imply:
If q = 0, then (7) implies that p t+1 = 0 for all t ≥ 0 (by using (G3)), and p 0 = 0 by (6). However, this contradicts the fact that the sequence {p t , q t } is non-null. Thus, q > 0, and we normalize by letting q = 1. Furthermore, it follows from (6) and (7) that {p t , q t } is given by (P) and that this sequence is unique up to a positive linear tranformation. In particular, p t > 0 for all t ≥ 0 (using (G3)), implying that non-wastefulness follows directly from (4). Finally, (6) and (7) imply that
showing that (H) holds.
The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1 Under (G1)-(G3), if {k t , m t , c t } is an interior and competitive path from (k, m) ∈ R 2 ++ with associated sequence {p t , q t } of price pairs given by (P), then the price sequence {p t } is decreasing.
Proof. We have that the price sequence {p t } is decreasing since
by (6) and (G3) and the fact that {k t , m t , c t } is interior.
That the sequence {p t } of capital prices is decreasing corresponds to a positive rate of interest associated with the positive net capital productivity of G. It means that the sequence {p t , q t } of positive price pairs as determined by (P) is expressed as present-value prices, where time-discounting is an integral part of the price system.
In discrete time the value of net investments at time t ≥ 0 along a competitive path, {k t , m t , c t }, can be defined in terms of early or late pricing, respectively:
As we will see, these measures of the value of net investments differ along an efficient and egalitarian path and cannot both be zero. Still, we will be able to show that an efficient and egalitarian path is characterized by the requirement that resource rents be reinvested in augmentable capital in all time periods, provided that we adopt some valuation rule intermediate between early and late pricing, as stated in the following adaptation of Hartwick's rule to the discrete-time setting.
Definition 1 (Hartwick's rule in the discrete-time DHS model) Hartwick's rule is followed in time period t along an interior and competitive path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m) ∈ R 2 ++ with associated sequence {p t , q t } of price pairs given by (P) if
Properties of an efficient and egalitarian path
In this section, we present the main result of the paper (Theorem 1) on efficient and egalitarian paths. As prerequisites of that result, we develop basic properties associated with such paths. These can be conveniently separated into competitive conditions (presented in Section 3.1), and conditions on the value of investments (presented in Section 3.2).
The converse of Hartwick's result establishes that the Hartwick's rule is followed forever along any efficient and egalitarian path. In order to ensure that this problem is non-trivial, we assume that:
where Ω is defined as follows: Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) , by imposing their additional assumption (A4), show that this implies the existence of an efficient and egalitarian path. However, as noted in the introduction, the imposition of assumption (A4) would seriously weaken our main result, by significantly constraining the class of technologies we would consider. Hence, we limit our discussion of technological conditions by noting that, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, as given by (1), every pair (k, m) ∈ R 2 ++ belongs to Ω provided α > β; this can be inferred from results reported in Dasgupta and Mitra (1983) and Cass and Mitra (1991) .
Let (k, m) ∈ Ω. Note that, for any efficient path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m), such that c t is a positive constant for all t ≥ 0, we must have the positive constant to be unique. (For if there were two such constants, then the path with the lower constant consumption would be inefficient.) Consequently, with each (k, m) ∈ Ω, we can associate this unique constant consumption level, and denote it by c(k, m).
Thus, a consequence of (E) is the following observation: (E ) There are (k, m) ∈ Ω and an efficient and egalitarian path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m) with c t = c(k, m) > 0 for all t ≥ 0.
In what follows, we fix a stock pair (k, m) ∈ Ω (which exists by condition (E)), and we fix an efficient and egalitarian path (which exists by observation (E )), and denote it by {k t , m t , c t }; furthermore, we denote c(k, m) by c.
Competitive conditions
We define:
Thus, S(c) is the pair of initial stocks that enable consumption to be maintained at or above c = c(k, m) > 0. 1 Clearly, for each t ≥ 0, we have (k t , m t ) ∈ S(c).
We will note two important properties of the set S(c); these are stated in Lemmas 2 and 3. These properties will be used to establish a 'cost minimization' property of an efficient and egalitarian path in Proposition 1.
For statement of the first of these lemmas (as well as for the proof of Proposition 1), define, for each t ≥ 0, the set of stock vectors where neither stock exceeds (k t , m t ):
Lemma 2 Under (G1)-(G3) and (E), for each t ≥ 0, S(c) ∩ R t = {(k t , m t )}.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary t ≥ 0.
Assume that there exists {k τ , m τ , c τ } ∈ F(k , m ) with c τ ≥ c for all τ ≥ 0, where k < k t and m ≤ m t . Construct {k τ , m τ , c τ } ∈ F(k t , m t ) by letting
c 0 ≥ c = c t , since k < k t and m ≤ m t , while c τ = c τ ≥ c = c t+τ for all τ ≥ 1. This contradicts the fact that {k t , m t , c t } is efficient.
Next, assume that there exists {k τ , m τ , c τ } ∈ F(k , m ) with c τ ≥ c for all t ≥ 0, where k ≤ k t and m < m t . By (G2), k > 0, since otherwise c τ = 0 < c for all
c 0 ≥ c = c t , since k ≤ k t and m < m t , while c τ = c τ ≥ c = c t+τ for all τ ≥ 1. This contradicts the fact that {k t , m t , c t } is efficient.
Lemma 2 leads to the following corollary. This has already been established by Dasgupta and Mitra (1983, Proposition 2), but we state and prove the result here for completeness.
Corollary 2 Under (G1)-(G3) and (E), the efficient and egalitarian path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m) ∈ Ω with c t = c > 0 for all t ≥ 0 is interior and satisfies k t+1 > k t for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. Since by feasibility we have m t+1 ≤ m t , it follows from Lemma 2 that k t+1 ≥ k t , and consequently G(k t , m t − m t+1 ) ≥ c > 0. By (G2), we must have k t > 0 and m t > m t+1 , so that {k t , m t , c t } is interior. Furthermore, by Lemma 2, k t+1 = k t is ruled out, so we must have k t+1 > k t .
Lemma 3 Under (G1), S(c) is a convex subset of R 2 + .
Proof. Assume that (k , m ) and (k , m ) are both in S(c). Hence, there exist {k t , m t , c t } ∈ F(k , m ) with c t ≥ c for all t ≥ 0 and {k t , m t , c t } ∈ F(k , m ) with c t ≥ c for all t ≥ 0. Let λ ∈ (0, 1), and define {k t , m t , c t } for all t ≥ 0 by
Since c t = λc t + (1 − λ)c t ≥ λc + (1 − λ)c = c for all t ≥ 0, it suffices to show that c t + k t+1 ≤ G(k t , m t − m t+1 ) + k t for all t ≥ 0. This holds since:
where the second inequality follows since, by (G1), G is concave.
Proposition 1 Under (G1)-(G3) and (E), for each t ≥ 0, there exists a non-null and non-negative price pair (P t , Q t ) such that (k t , m t ) minimizes P t k + Q t m over all (k , m ) ∈ S(c).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary t ≥ 0 and define:
Clearly, R t is a convex subset of R 2 , and since S(c) is a convex subset of R 2 by
means there would exist (k , m ) ∈ S(c) with (k , m ) (k t , m t ), which is impossible by Lemma 2. Thus, we can apply the separation theorem 3.5 in Nikaido (1968, p. 35) to assert that there exists (P t , Q t ) ∈ R 2 + , with (P t , Q t ) non-null, such that:
This means that for all (k , m ) ∈ R t and (k , m ) ∈ S(c), we must have:
Since (k t , m t ) ∈ R(t), we must have:
This establishes the proposition.
The following result shows that the efficient and egalitarian path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m) ∈ Ω with c t = c > 0 for all t ≥ 0 satisfies Hotelling's rule, among other properties. Note that the proof of this result only uses the efficiency and interiority of the path; the fact that {k t , m t , c t } is egalitarian is not directly invoked.
Proposition 2 Under (G1)-(G3) and (E), the efficient and egalitarian path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m) ∈ Ω with c t = c > 0 for all t ≥ 0 is non-wasteful and satisfies
Hotelling's rule and resource exhaustion.
Proof. (i) If c s +k s+1 < G(k s , m s −m s+1 )+k s for some s ≥ 0, then consumption can be increased at time s without changing consumption at any other time t ≥ 0.
This contradicts the fact that {k t , m t , c t } is efficient. Hence,
(ii) Since m t is non-increasing in t, and non-negative, the sequence {m t } has a non-negative limit: lim t→∞ m t ≥ 0. Suppose lim t→∞ m t > 0. Then resource use can be increased at some time s ≥ 0 without changing resource use at any other time t ≥ 0. By (G3) and the fact that {k t , m t , c t } is interior, production and therefore consumption can be increased at time s, without changing consumption at any other time t ≥ 0; this contradicts the fact that {k t , m t , c t } is efficient. Hence, we must have lim t→∞ m t = 0, showing that {k t , m t , c t } satisfies resource exhaustion.
(iii) By Corollary 2, {k t , m t , c t } is interior, so it only remains to show that (H)
holds. Fix an arbitrary t ≥ 0. Denote m t − m t+1 by r t and m t+1 − m t+2 by r t+1 .
The triple (k t+1 , r t , r t+1 ) clearly minimizes the sum r t + r t+1 of resource use in time periods t and t + 1 over all triples k t+1 , r t , r t+1 0 that satisfy the set of constraints:
For if there is a triple (k t+1 , r t , r t+1 ) 0 which satisfies this set of constraints, and ε := (r t + r t+1 ) − (r t + r t+1 ) > 0, then (k, m − ε) ∈ S(c), and this has been shown to be impossible by Lemma 2.
Clearly (k t+1 , r t , r t+1 ) 0 satisfies each of the constraints in this set with equality (since {k t , m t , c t } is non-wasteful). Therefore (k t+1 , r t , r t+1 ) := (k t+1 , r t +θ, r t+1 + θ) satisfies each of the constraints with strict inequality (by (G3)), so that Slater's Condition is satisfied. Since G is concave (by (G1)), we can invoke the version of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem due to Arrow, Hurwicz and Uzawa (1961) to assert that there exist (p t+1 , p t+2 ) ∈ R 2 + such that the following first-order conditions hold:
Since {k t , m t , c t } is interior, we can use (G3) and the second and third equations above to infer that (p t+1 , p t+2 ) ∈ R 2 ++ . Now, the above set of equations yields:
Since t ≥ 0 is arbitrary, this establishes (H).
Corollary 3 Under (G1)- (G3) and (E), the efficient and egalitarian path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m) ∈ Ω with c t = c > 0 for all t ≥ 0 is competitive with associated sequence {p t , q t } of price pairs given by (P).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2 and Lemma 1.
We can now state an important property of an efficient and egalitarian path, namely that it satisfies the 'cost minimization' property in terms of competitive prices. In the proof of this result we utilize the observation that, for each t ≥ 0, S t (c) ⊆ S(c), where S t (c) denotes the set of initial pairs of stocks that enable consumption to be maintained at or above c, provided that {k τ , m τ , c τ } with (k τ , m τ , c τ ) = (k t+1+τ , m t+1+τ , c t+1+τ ) for all τ ≥ 0 is followed from (k t+1 , m t+1 ):
Hence, by Proposition 1 and the fact that (k t , m t ) ∈ S t (c), we have that, for each
, which, by the differentiability of G, leads to the result that the price ratio P t /Q t equals the competitive price ratio p t as given by (P).
Proposition 3 Assume (G1)-(G3) and (E), and let the price sequence {p t } be determined by (P) from the efficient and egalitarian path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m) ∈ Ω with c t = c > 0 for all t ≥ 0. Then, for each t ≥ 0, we have that (k t , m t ) minimizes
Proof. Fix an arbitrary t ≥ 0. Define
and let x : X → R determine the excess of consumption in time period t relative to c, if the stock vector (k , m ) at time t is transformed to the stock vector (k t+1 , m t+1 ) at time t + 1 in a non-wasteful manner:
Then, X is an open set in R 2 and x is continuously differentiable on X (by (G3)).
Furthermore, since {k t , m t , c t } is non-wasteful by Proposition 2, we have x(k t , m t ) = 0. Note that by interiority of {k t , m t , c t } and (G3),
Hence, we can invoke the Implicit Function Theorem (see Rudin, 1976, Theorem 9.28, pp. 224-5) to assert that there is an open interval A containing k t , and a unique function m : A → R which, for each k ∈ A, determines the smallest resource stock m(k ) = m enabling consumption to equal c at time t when (k , m ) at time t is transformed to (k t+1 , m t+1 ) at time t + 1. In effect, the function m maps the frontier of the set S t (c), as defined by (8), in a neighborhood of (k t , m t ). We have:
Using (i) and (iii), we have:
And, using
(ii) and the definition of x, we obtain:
We obtain (k , m(k )) ∈ S(c) for all k ∈ A by combining (a) the property that, for each k ∈ A, m(k ) enables consumption to equal c at time t when (k , m(k )) at time t is transformed to (k t+1 , m t+1 ) at time t+1 with (b) the fact that (k t+1 , m t+1 ) ∈ S(c).
Using Proposition 1, we can therefore write:
Since A is an open set, the following first-order condition must hold:
which, using (9), yields:
Thus, since (P t , Q t ) is non-null and non-negative, we have (P t , Q t ) ∈ R 2 ++ and:
by (P), thereby establishing the result.
Conditions on the value of net investments
We are now in a position to state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1 Under (G1)-(G3), if the path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m) ∈ Ω with c t = c > 0 for all t ≥ 0 is efficient and egalitarian, then Harwick's rule as redefined in Definition 1 is satisfied in all time periods t ≥ 0. Furthermore, for all t ≥ 0, the value of net investments, E t , measured in early pricing is non-negative and non-increasing, and the value of net investments, L t , measured in late pricing is non-positive and non-decreasing. The two measures differ for all t ≥ 0, but both converge to 0 as t → ∞.
Proof. Assume that the path {k t , r t , c t } from (k, m) ∈ R 2 ++ is efficient and egalitarian. Hence, by Corollary 3, the path is competitive with associated sequence {p t , q t } of price pairs given by (P). Furthermore, by Proposition 3, for all t ≥ 0,
since (k t , m t ) ∈ S(c) for all t ≥ 0. Likewise, for all t ≥ 0, p t k t + m t ≤ p t k t+1 + m t+1 , or equivalently:
Hence, by (10) and (11), for all t ≥ 0, there exists p ∈ [p t+1 , p t ] such that
since, by Corollaries 1 and 2, the price sequence {p t } is decreasing and the capital sequence {k t } is increasing. This shows that Hartwick's rule as redefined in Definition 1 is satisfied in all time periods t ≥ 0 along an efficient and egalitarian path.
Since the path {k t , m t , c t } is competitive and, by Proposition 2, non-wasteful, it
follows from (C) that, for all t ≥ 1:
By re-arranging and using the fact that {k t , m t , c t } is egalitarian (so that c t = c t−1 for all t ≥ 1), we have that:
hold for all t ≥ 1. By (10) and (12), the value of net investments, L t , measured in late pricing is non-positive and non-decreasing. Likewise, by (11) and (13), the value of net investments, E t , measured in early pricing is non-negative and non-increasing.
By Corollaries 1 and 2, the price sequence {p t } is decreasing and the capital sequence {k t } is increasing, implying that, at any t ≥ 0,
so that the two measures differ for all t ≥ 0.
Since, for all t ≥ 0, L t is non-positive and non-decreasing and E t is non-negative and non-increasing, it follows that the limits, L = lim t→∞ L t and E = lim t→∞ E t , exist, and furthermore, L ≤ 0 ≤ E. Hence, to show that L = 0 = E, it is sufficient to show that E ≤ L, or equivalently, by (14):
Using Corollary 2 and (P) and writing r t = m t − m t+1 , we have:
for all t ≥ 0, by (G1) and (G2). Hence, by (15), E ≤ L is established by showing:
To show this, the following claim is helpful.
Claim: lim t→∞ k t = ∞. Suppose the claim is not true. Then, by Corollary 2, there existsk > 0 such that k t ≤k for all t ≥ 0 and, by (G1):
We have lim t→∞ G(k, m t ) = 0 by (G1) and (G2), as lim t→∞ m t = 0 by Proposition 2. By (17), this contradicts that c t = c > 0 for all t ≥ 0.
By the claim we may choose s ≥ 0 such that k t ≥ 1 for all t ≥ s, implying that
for all t ≥ s, by (G1). We have lim t→∞ G(1, m t ) = 0 by (G1) and (G2), as lim t→∞ m t = 0 by Proposition 2. This shows (16).
For the sake of completeness, we state the following result, using the style of proof in Mitra et al. (2013, Proposition 5) .
Proposition 4 Under (G1)-(G3) and (E), the efficient and egalitarian path {k t , m t , c t } from (k, m) ∈ Ω with c t = c > 0 for all t ≥ 0 satisfies the capital-value transversality condition.
It is noteworthy that the capital-value transversality condition obtains without imposing an assumption that resource use be 'important' (in the sense of (A4) or (A4 ) of Dasgupta and Mitra, 1983) .
Proof. By Corollary 2, {k t , m t , c t } is interior. Hence, by (P), it remains to show that lim t→∞ p t k t = 0. We show this by first establishing an intermediate claim.
Claim: lim t→∞ p t = 0. Let t ≥ 1. Then:
where the first inequality follows since, by Corollaries 1 and 2, the price sequence {p t } is decreasing and the capital sequence {k t } is increasing, and the second inequality follows from (10). Now, lim t→∞ p t = 0 follows since, by the proof of Theorem 1,
To establish lim t→∞ p t k t = 0, it is sufficient to show that, for all > 0, there exists s ≥ 0 such that p t k t ≤ ε for all t ≥ s . As lim t→∞ m t = 0 by Proposition 2, there exists s ≥ 0 such that m s ≤ ε/2. By the Claim, there exists s > s such that p t k s ≤ ε/2 for all t ≥ s . Since, as in the Claim,
for all t > s, it follows from the choice of s and s that
for all t ≥ s , thereby establishing the capital-value transversality condition.
Say that an interior and competitive path {k t , m t , c t } from (k , m ) ∈ R 2 + has finite consumption value if the associated price sequence {p t } determined by (P) satisfies ∞ t=0 p t+1 c t < ∞. This is equivalent to ∞ t=0 p t+1 < ∞ if c t = c > 0 for all t ≥ 0. As defined by Burmeister and Hammond (1977) and Dixit, Hoel and Hammond (1980) 
++ , then the path is interior and competitive at associated prices (p(τ ), q(τ )). Furthermore, q(τ ) is a positive constant which can be normalized to 1, p(τ ) > 0 decreases as τ increases,k(τ ) > 0 for τ ≥ 0, and:
Let t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}. Sincek(τ ) > 0 for all τ ≥ 0, it is possible to define p as the weighted mean of the competitive capital prices in the interval [t, t + 1], where the weights are given by the rates of capital investment:
Then, by using (18) and noting that t+1 tk (τ )dτ = k(t+1)−k(t) and t+1 tṁ (τ )dτ = m(t + 1) − m(t), we obtain: Finally, the Mean Value Theorem of Integral Calculus will ensure (under continuity of the functions p(τ ) andk(τ )) that there is in fact a point of time s ∈ [t, t + 1] such that the competitive price at s, p(s), equals p as given by (19).
The question remains whether some variant of Hartwick's result can established in the discrete-time setting: Is it the case that, if along an efficient path Hartwick's rule is followed forever, then an egalitarian path will be implemented?
If the efficient path is interior (so that capital and resource use are positive in each time period), then it follows by the proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 that the path is competitive. Therefore, we obtain the following analogs to (12) and (13) for a path that is not necessarily egalitarian:
p t (c t − c t−1 ) + (E t − E t−1 ) ≤ 0 .
Thus, keeping the value of net investments constant in the present-value prices determined by (P) leads to non-increasing consumption if early pricing is applied, and non-decreasing consumption if late pricing is applied. The latter result can be rephrased as saying that keeping the value of net investments constant in terms of late pricing ensures 'sustained development', as defined by Pezzey (1997) . Keeping the value of net investments in present-value prices constant (but not necessarily equal to zero) corresponds to the so-called Dixit-Hammond-Hoel rule (Dixit, Hoel and Hammond, 1980) .
One can now proceed to show that keeping the value of net investments in early pricing constant and negative forever contradicts feasibility of the path, and investigate the assumptions under which keeping the value of net investments in late pricing constant and positive forever contradicts efficiency of the path. However, as we have seen from the main result of this paper, even though an efficient and egalitarian path is characterized by a non-negative competitive value of net investments in early pricing and a non-positive competitive value of net investments in late pricing, these measures of net investments will not remain constant. Rather, a mixture of these measures, determined by the efficient and egalitarian path and being specific to each time period, remains constant and equal to zero in each time period.
Thus, neither the value of net investments in early pricing nor the value of net investments in late pricing value can be used to steer the economy along a path that is exactly egalitarian. In addition, there is the problem that appears also in the continuous-time setting of determining the initial rate of resource use, so that the egalitarian path exhausts the resource precisely in the limit when time is approaching infinity. Clearly, exhaustion in finite time would lead to infeasibility, while letting part of the resource stock remain unutilized would lead to inefficiency.
Hence, the problems that arise also in continuous time-limiting the applicability of Hartwick's rule as a prescriptive rule for sustainability-remains also in the discrete-time setting. In addition, with discrete time, as we have seen from the main result of this paper, the exact relative price between capital and resource to be ap-plied in each time period is derived from the efficient and egalitarian path. Thus, in discrete time it seems challenging to use Hartwick's rule to steer the economy along an efficient and egalitarian path.
